It is a class of submarine which is designed to counter a very sophisticated Soviet submarine and naval threat which none of our potential adversaries in the developing world possess. The SSN-21 class submarine does not reflect these realities or the lessons of the gulf war. It does a better job of recognizing the possibility of future conflicts throughout the world, and that the threats posed by Hafez Assad, Muammar Qadhafi, Kim Il-song, and others is still very real. It does a better job of reflecting the fact that the likelihood of conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union is very remote, and I say that as one of the last cold warriors. We know that if we need to face the future Saddam Hussein's of this world, we need increases in several critical power projection capabilities that we have failed to fund.Īt the conclusion of the consideration of this bill in the other body, one of my colleagues said `This bill does not respond to any lessons learned from the Persian Gulf war.' I believe that the bill produced by this body does a better job of responding to these lessons and the end of the cold war. For example, many experts argue that the reason there was no amphibious landing in the Persian Gulf war was because of the danger Iraqi mines posed to our ships as they approached the coast of Kuwait. We are clearly in agreement that this Nation's defense establishment needs an improvement in its sealift capability an improvement in its airlift capability and an improvement it its mine countermeasures capability. There are others on which we are in agreement. There were many lessons of the Persian Gulf war. President, we do not need to spend 25 percent of the Navy's shipbuilding budget on a ship that is designed for threats to this Nation's vital security interests that no longer exist, and vanished with the end of the cold war. It is a tactical advance over its predecessor and it represents a significant increase in capability, although scarcely as much as the Navy claims. There are two basic reasons why the SSN-21 submarine is not needed, and why the expenditure of $30 billion to $50 billion over the next 10 years, is not necessary. It authorizes the Secretary of Defense to spend this fund for payment of termination costs for the SSN-21 Program, for the construction of a new SSN-688 class submarine, for RDT&E on an advanced follow-on submarine and for improvement of sealift capability. The amendment I am proposing deletes authorization of $1.8 billion for the SSN-21, the so-called Seawolf. President, I know that some of my colleagues are very interested in seeing that we move this bill along as we are all preparing for recess and I will probably ask unanimous consent to withdraw this amendment after I have discussed what I believe is a very important issue. (3) The Secretary of Defense may allocate the amounts specified in paragraphs (1) and (2) for the purposes set out in paragraph (1) as the Secretary considers appropriate in the national security interests of the United States. (2) Of the amount authorized to be appropriated by section 102(a)(3)(B), $2,061,100,000 shall be available for the purposes set out in paragraph (1). (C) Research, development, test, and evaluation for an advanced follow-on submarine. (B) Construction of a new SSN-688 class submarine. (A) Payment of termination costs of the Seawolf (SSN-21) class submarine program. (b) Reallocation of Authorized Appropriations.-(1) Of the amount authorized to be appropriated by section 102(a)(3)(A), $1,803,200,000 shall be available for the following purposes: (a) Termination of Program.-Funds appropriated for the Department of Defense may not be obligated or expended for construction of any Seawolf (SSN-21) class submarine. TERMINATION OF THE SEAWOLF CLASS SUBMARINE PROGRAM. On page 17, below line 22, insert the following: President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with. The Senator from Arizona proposes an amendment numbered 1045. The assistant legislative clerk read as follows: President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration. (PURPOSE: TO TERMINATE THE SEAWOLF (SSN-21) CLASS SUBMARINE PROGRAM AND TO REALLOCATE THE AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR SUCH PROGRAM) NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEARS 19 (Senate - August 02, 1991) 1045 (PURPOSE: TO TERMINATE THE SEAWOLF (SSN-21) CLASS SUBMARINE PROGRAM AND TO REALLOCATE THE AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR SUCH PROGRAM) NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEARS 19 (Senate - August 02, 1991)
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